



Contemporary Philosophy

## Heidegger On Traditional Language And Technological Language

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**ABSTRACT:** On July 18, 1962, Martin Heidegger delivered a lecture entitled *Traditional Language and Technological Language* in which he argues that the opposition between these two languages concerns our very essence. I examine the nature of this opposition by developing his argument within his particular context and in the general light of his reflections on language. In different sections on technology and language, I summarize much of what he had said in previous writings on the topic (viz., “Die Frage nach der Technik” and “Der Weg zur Sprache”), including his preliminary comments contrasting instruction with teaching, and characterizing this reflection in terms of its uselessness. The central issue connecting these seemingly varying themes is the status of education in our modern technological age and, more specifically, of instruction in the mother tongue. Heidegger’s concern for the status of instruction in the mother tongue is, as we will see later, directly connected to his distinction between the two forms of language.

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On July 18, 1962, Martin Heidegger delivered a lecture entitled *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache* <sup>(1)</sup> (*Traditional Language and Technological Language*) in which he argues that the opposition between these languages concerns our very essence. In this paper I examine the nature of this opposition by developing his argument in this particular context and in the general light of his reflections on language.

Addressed to science teachers in a vocational school, Heidegger’s lecture offers some relatively uncomplicated formulations of theses he had already developed mainly in “Die Frage nach der Technik” <sup>(2)</sup> and “Der Weg zur Sprache.” <sup>(3)</sup> There are two main sections, one on technology, the other on language, which summarize much of what he had said in those previous writings. There is, however, a preliminary comment in which he contrasts instruction with teaching, and an introductory section in which he characterizes his reflection in terms of its uselessness. The issue connecting these seemingly varying themes

here is the status of education in our modern technological age and, more specifically, of instruction in the mother tongue. Heidegger's concern for the status of instruction in the mother tongue is, as we will later see, directly connected to his distinction between the two forms of language.

Speaking thus to his particular audience, Heidegger claims he is not instructing but teaching them in the sense of letting-learn, where learning comprises bringing our life into the correspondence with what grants itself to us in its essence. In this context, it is a matter of learning about what is named in the names 'language,' 'technology,' 'tradition,' and this involves what is named 'school' in broad sense of educational system.

It is significant that Heidegger is broaching the subject *via linguistica* for he criticizes here a definite form and interpretation of language. A form of language in which such names as 'language,' 'technology' and 'tradition' name that for which an adequate determination is lacking that will allow us to experience what is today in our modern technological age and threatens our very Dasein. An interpretation of language that fails to grasp that there is a mutual dependence between having an adequate relation to a thing and there being a genuine language. Hence, Heidegger urges that it is not a matter of indifference, as such form and interpretation of language would have it, what these names "say to us," "how we hear them," and "whether in themselves they grant us what is today." (4) Such matter thus calls for a reflection, or as Heidegger defines it, for an awakening of the sense for the useless. This, precisely in our age when we only value what is immediately useful. Yet the sense of things themselves is, as Dsuang-Dsi, a student of Lao Tse, suggested, to be useless, to resist being immediately practical, and thus to remain inviolate. In fact, their usefulness depends on this. (5)

Heidegger thus proposes a rethinking or, better, a transformation of our thinking regarding technology, language, and tradition. Since such rethinking takes place within the realm of modern technology, the first task here is to rethink technology. Thought from this perspective, the current conception of technology in anthropological, instrumental and modern scientific terms is correct, but not true. Thought from this perspective, the word 'technology' itself reveals, via its Greek roots, the true meaning of technology as a knowing that sets something hither in the manifest [*Her-stellen*]. Thought from this perspective, what is peculiar to modern technology is revealed as the demand extended over humans whereby they are challenged forth to challenge nature forth into preparation, that is, as what Heidegger had already called Enframing [*Ge-stell*].

The rethinking of language takes place from this rethinking of technology. The relation between technology and language is crucial for a rethinking of language in our modern technological age. It is thus necessary to talk about the technological language, which he defines as "a language that is technologically determined by what is most peculiar to technology," (6) that is, by Enframing. It is thus imperative that we ask what is language that it remains exposed in a special way to the dictate of technology. (7) Such exigencies are only met in the rethinking of the current conception of language which Heidegger characterizes thus:

Speech is: (1) A faculty, an activity and achievement of humans. It is: (2) The operation of the instruments for communication and hearing.

Speech is: (3) The expression and communication of emotions accompanied by thoughts in the service of information.

Speech is: (4) A representing and portraying of the real and unreal. (8)

In the metaphysical connection between language and thinking as Heidegger has seen it, metaphysics defines language in terms of thinking, thinking as a human activity of representing objects, and thus language as a means for conveying information about objects. Metaphysics places thinking as the determining factor in the relation between language and thinking. This is deemed evident in our current conception of language as an “instrument of expression” in the “service of thinking,” (9) and in the common view, which believes that thought uses language merely as its “medium” or a means of expression. (10)

Heidegger located this metaphysical conception of language in the tenets of various philosophies of language (11) such as Humbolt’s (12) and Hamman’s. (13) But the conception of language as a mere means of exchange undergoes a revival and a consolidation to extremes in our modern technological age that is expressed in the definition of language as information. Analytic philosophy offers a prime example of a “metaphysical-technological explanation” of language stemming from the “calculative frame of mind.” Years later, he continued these associations when explicitly labeling Carnap’s position a “technical-scientific view of language.” (14) According to Heidegger, this view believes that thinking and speaking are “exhausted by theoretical and natural-scientific representation and statement,” and that they “refer to objects and only to objects.” Language, as a tool of “scientific-technological knowing” -which “must establish its theme in advance as a calculable, causally explicable *Gegenstand*“-- is thus “only an instrument that we employ to manipulate objects.” (15) One of his assessments of the influence of analytic philosophy in our modern technological age is especially noteworthy:

Of late, the scientific and philosophical investigation of languages is aiming more resolutely at the production of what is called “metalanguage.” Analytic philosophy, which is set on producing this super-language is quite consistent when it considers itself metalinguistics. That sounds like metaphysics -not only sounds like it, it is metaphysics. Metalinguistics is the thoroughgoing technicalization of all languages into the sole operative instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik, metalinguistics and rocketry are the Same. (16)

Given the logical bent of analytical philosophy it is also worth noting that Heidegger directly associated modern mathematical and symbolic logic or, to use his own term, “*Logistik*“ with metaphysics. Logistics was for him the “unbroken rule of metaphysics” establishing itself everywhere, and modern epistemology acquiring a “decisive position of dominance.” (17) It was a matter of grave concern for him to see that logistics was being

considered everywhere “the only possible form of strict philosophy” on the grounds that its procedures and results are deemed productive for what he called “the construction of the technological universe.” (18) The negative characterizations of logistics abound: It is a “logical degeneration” of traditional categorical logic, (19) and its development a sign of the “decay of philosophy,” (20) an indication of its “dissolution” and “completion.” (21) The negative force of such depictions is proportional to the weight he assigns to the general role of logic in metaphysics. As the doctrine of *logos* interpreted as assertion or statement, logic is the doctrine of thinking and the science of statement, that is, it provides the authoritative interpretations of thinking and speaking that rule throughout the oblivion of being in metaphysics. More specifically, logistics has as its basis the modern interpretation of statement or assertion as the “connection of representations.” (22) It is in this sense that he regards it as another manifestation of the “unchecked power of modern thinking” itself. (23) Correspondingly, Heidegger depicts the connections between logic and modern technology in very dramatic tones:

Without the *legein* of [Western] logic, modern man would have to make do without his automobile. There would be no airplanes, no turbines, no Atomic Energy Commission. Without the *logos*, of logic, the world would look different. (24)

The general form metaphysical thinking takes is thus labeled a “scientific-technological manner of thinking.” It threatens to “spread to all realms” thereby magnifying the “deceptive appearance which makes all thinking and speaking seem objectifying.” It is this form of objectifying thinking which strives to “represent everything henceforth only technologically-scientifically as an object of possible control and manipulation.” With it, language itself takes a corresponding form: “deformed into an instrument of reportage and calculable information.” (25) However, while the form language takes is thus instrumental for such form of thinking, it exerts its own influence insofar as it is “treated like a manipulable object to which our manner of thinking must conform.” (26)

Heidegger also referred to the metaphysical manner of thinking in our age as a “one-track thinking,” a term which he explicitly associated with technology. (27) In a similar spirit, he called it a “one-sided thinking” that tends towards a “one-sided uniform view” in which “[everything] is leveled to one level,” and “[our] minds hold views on all and everything, and view all things in the same way.” (28) There is, to be sure, a kind of language that, as the expression of this form of thinking, is itself one-track and one-sided. Heidegger finds one “symptom” of the growing power of the technological form of thinking in our increased use of designations consisting of abbreviations of words or combinations of their initials. (29) It is thus a technological form of language in the sense that it heralds that order in which everything is reduced to the univocity of concepts and precise specifications.

Heidegger labels such interpretations “technological” while remarking that they are a given only “insofar as technology is itself understood as a means and everything is conceived only according to this respect.” (30) If our way of thinking is one that values only that which is immediately useful, then language is only conceived and appreciated from this perspective of its usefulness for us. More importantly, this suggests it is the essence of

technology as Enframing that somehow determines what he calls the “transformation of language into mere information.” (31)

We can assume that, if the essence of modern technology is Enframing, then there is also a “language of Enframing.” Indeed, Heidegger claimed that

[All] ordering finds itself channeled into calculative thinking and therefore speaks the language of Enframing. Speaking is challenged to correspond in every respect to Enframing in which all present beings can be commandeered. (32)

It is within Enframing, then, that “speaking turns into information.” Heidegger also spoke of the “language machine” [*Sprachmaschine*] as “one manner in which modern technology controls the mode and the world of language as such.” (33) We can infer that the language machine is one crucial way in which this language of Enframing speaks. (34) With the construction of what Heidegger called electronic brains, calculating, thinking and translating machines, the language machine is made possible insofar as their activities take place in the element of language. The term “language machine” should not be taken as if Heidegger were merely talking about calculators and computers. He referred to machine technology itself as “the most visible outgrowth of the essence of modern technology,” (35) and he insisted that the fact ours was the age of the machine was due to the fact it is the technological age, and not vice versa. (36) More importantly, Enframing itself is not anything technological in the sense of mechanical parts and their assembly. Thus, the language of Enframing cannot itself be reduced to anything technological in this narrow sense. Moreover, Heidegger explicitly characterized the language machine as the “technical complex of calculating and translating machines.” (37) He also distinguished it from what he called the “speaking machine” or recording apparatus. The distinction is important because he does not see the latter as “intruding into the speaking of language itself.” The language machine, on the other hand, does intrude by regulating and adjusting through its mechanical energies and functions how we can use language. (38)

If there is a transformation of language into the language machine that speaks the language of Enframing, then the question is what is the essence of language itself that it allows for its transformation into a technological language, into information? Heidegger’s answer to this question again takes the *via linguistica* by focusing on “what language itself gives us to think” with the word ‘*sagen*’ (to say). (39) The essence of language is thus defined from the essence of language: It is a Saying that shows, in the sense of letting-appear.

The possibility of a technological language lies here, for it is itself a Saying-Showing that is limited to the mere making of signs for the communication of information. As illustrated with Morse code signs, all that remains of language in information is “the abstract form of writing that is transcribed into the formulae of a logic calculus” whose clarity “ensures the possibility of a secure and rapid communication.” (40) The principles transforming language are technological-calculative. Thus, Heidegger attaches much importance to the fact that “it is from the technological possibilities of the machine that the instruction is set out as to how language can and shall still be language.” (41) Such instruction spells out the absolute

and overriding need for the clarity of signs and their sequences. The fact that the machine's structure conforms to linguistic tasks such as translating does not mean that the reverse holds true. For these tasks are "in advance and fundamentally bound up" with the language machine. With the "inexorability of the limitless reign" of technology, the insatiable technological demand for a technological language, its power increases to the point that the technological language comes to threaten the very essence of language as Saying-Showing. It is "the severest and most menacing attack on what is peculiar to language," (42) for language is "atrophied" into the mere transmission of signals. (43)

Moreover, when information is held as highest form of language on account of its univocity, certainty and speed, then, says Heidegger, we have a "corresponding conception" of the human being and of human life. He sees this occurring, for instance, in Norbert Wiener, a founder of Cybernetics, who said that language "is not an exclusive attribute of man but is one he may share to a certain degree with the machines he has constructed." (44) This view is itself possible, Heidegger argues, only when we presuppose that language is merely means of information. For him, this represents, at the same time, a "threat to the human being's ownmost essence." (45) He issued a similar warning with a specific reference to the language machine. The fact that language is interpreted and used as an instrument has led us into believing that we are the masters of the language machine, but Heidegger urges that "the truth of the matter might well be that the language machine takes language into its management and masters the essence of the human being." (46)

Heidegger's assessments of the metaphysical-technological interpretation and form of language are indisputably critical and charged with dramatic and ominous warnings. His forebodings turn even gloomier when we consider the gripping mastering effect technological language has over our very essence. Moreover, language as such, insofar as it harbors the oblivion of being, makes "the step back out of metaphysics difficult." (47) Language itself "denies us its essence" and instead "surrenders itself" to us as our "instrument of domination over beings." (48) It is thus even difficult for us moderns to even "understand a non-instrumental concept of language." (49) The interpretation and form of "language as information" and of "information as language" is, in this sense, a circle determined by language, and in language, within "the web of language." (50) Hence, Heidegger has referred to language as "the danger of all dangers" that "necessarily conceals in itself a continual danger for itself." (51) In fact, "we are the stakes" in the "dangerous game and gamble" that the essence of language plays with us. (52)

Yet, in his own contrasts he seems to offer a decidedly non-instrumental conception of language. In fact, in his reactions to the general metaphysical interpretations of language and thought he issued his own counter-claims. Thus, while surmising that thinking and speaking form an identity belonging together to *logos* as the Saying-Showing of being, (53) he has proposed that "thinking is in the service of language" (54) and that "only when [humans] speak [do they] think -not the other way around as metaphysics still has it." (55) Therefore, in his "language is language" dictum (56) he has insisted that language as the primordial Saying-Showing of being cannot be explained in terms of or grounded in thinking or, for that matter, in anything. Evidently such Saying-Showing is not itself

primordially an objectifying thinking and speaking, but rather objectification itself is only possible on its grounds.

The anthropomorphic definition of language of metaphysics is also contested and inverted. Heidegger will propose instead what could be called a linguistic definition of the human being. He claims that the essence of language is “not anything human,” but rather “the human being is indeed in its nature given to speech -it is linguistic,” where “linguistic” means here taking place out of the *logos* of being. <sup>(57)</sup> Our ability to speak is what marks us as human being so that language is our very “foundation” of the human being <sup>(58)</sup> or “the event which disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence.” <sup>(59)</sup> Hence, the instrumental relation of the human being to language where the human being believes itself to be “the shaper and master of language” is really an “inversion of the true relation of dominance” where language “remains the master” of the human being. <sup>(60)</sup> Thus, Heidegger’s insistence that it is language which genuinely speaks. <sup>(61)</sup> Here, however, he will venture forth a less shocking statement by claiming that “to say properly, i.e., to show, i.e., to let appear is something humans can only do with what shows itself to them, which appears from itself, manifests and grants itself,” <sup>(62)</sup> and that our relationship to beings, including to the beings we ourselves are, “rests” on the letting appear, on the spoken and unspoken Saying-Showing. <sup>(63)</sup>

The definite conception of language that Heidegger issues forth in these counter-claims is not simply antithetical to the metaphysical-technological interpretations, as if he merely propounding a non-anthropomorphic and non-instrumental conception of language. Rather, he is suggesting that language as a human instrument is merely an effect of the essence of language as Saying-Showing. Thus, he has specifically urged that the

essence of language does not consist entirely in being a means of giving information. This definition does not touch its essential essence, but merely indicates an effect of its essence. <sup>(64)</sup>

Technological language is thus itself an effect of the essence of language as Saying-Showing. Neither language nor technology have shown to be anthropological and instrumental in their essence. Moreover, technology in its essence is nothing technological, in the sense of machines and their parts, and language in its essence is nothing linguistic, in the sense of human sounds or words. <sup>(65)</sup> Enframing, as the essence of technology, and Saying-Showing, as the essence of language, are not human doings. In fact, we are commandeered by Enframing, and founded on and mastered by Saying-Showing. Thus, in technological language there lies a convergence of these into the event that appropriates the human being to challenge-forth all that is and to speak about all that is in the terms of information. Moreover, Enframing dictates its mandate to Saying-Showing as it unfolds into technological language. In the language of Enframing the essence of technology prevails over the essence of language.

Heidegger asserted the twofoldedness of the essence of Enframing as the danger, or the disguising of being itself, and as the saving power, or the revealing of being itself. Neither as the danger nor as the saving power is it a human undertaking. Yet, the human being is

required for both. While the surmounting of technology, whereby being would unconceal its own concealment, requires the human being's cooperation, such cooperation is that of a pious thinking that ponders the essence of being and remains open to the turning of being. (66) He explicitly envisioned such thinking as accompanied by what he called a "releasement toward things," (67) characterized as "a comportment toward technology which expresses 'yes' and at the same time 'no'." This comportment takes the specific form of letting technical devices enter our daily life while, at the same time, leaving them "outside," leaving them "alone" as something that does not affect our "inner and real core" and as things that are "nothing absolute" and remain "dependent on something higher." (68)

In principle, then, Heidegger's position on the language of Enframing is not simply refractory, though it is certainly charged with negativity. (69) But, technological language threatens to drown out all other forms of Saying-Showing and thus to master our essence. Thus, in our world of the language machine, Heidegger bemoans the lack of a poet or

a house-friend who in equal manner and with equal force is inclined toward both the technologically constructed world-edifice *and* the world as the house for a more original dwelling. . . who is able to re-entrust the calculability and technology of nature to the open mystery of a newly experienced naturalness of nature. (70)

The possibility of also saying 'no' in our 'yes' to technological language seems to be related with a continued 'yes' to traditional language. In the information theory of language "natural language" is itself defined negatively as a "not-yet-formalized language," so that it "conceives of the natural aspect of language as a lack of formalization." (71) One of the proponents of this theory, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, said that "any attempt to make a part of language clear (through its formalization into a sign system) already presupposes the use of natural language, also there where it is not clear." (72) For Heidegger, this statement illustrates how natural language, this "non-technologized everyday language," represents a "limit" that "still survives . . . behind all technological transformation of the essence of language." (73) It is worth noting that Heidegger also insisted that "even language as information is not language per se," or "occurring of itself," but "historical" and with a "destiny." (74)

Defined positively, the so-called "natural language" is what Heidegger calls "*Überlieferte Sprache*," or traditional language. Since *Überlieferung* or tradition, means literally 'handing down over' or 'delivery,' Heidegger distinguishes the "handing down over" in tradition from the "mere passing on" [*Weitergabe*]. Such passing on is perhaps compared best with what Heidegger characterized as "*Tradition*" in *Sein und Zeit*. It barely makes accessible what it "gives over" to the point of covering it up, "delivering over" to self-evidence "what has come handed down over to us" and blocking our access to the primordial sources from which it is "handed down over to us." (75) Such *Tradition*, or tradition in its negative sense, can only occur in technological language. In fact, with the inauthentic form of thinking in our age, language itself flounders in inauthenticity as it

thereby falls into the service of expediting communication along routes where

objectification -the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone- branches out and disregards all limits. In this way language comes under the dictatorship of the public realm which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as unintelligible. (76)

Technological language is thus the language of inauthenticity. It is the modern technological *Gerede*. (77) Cyber-talk is idle talk.

Traditional language, in the positive sense of tradition, is the “preservation of what is original,” as the “safeguarding of the new possibilities of the already spoken language.” It “contains and grants” what remains “unspoken.” It harbors thus new ways of Saying-Showing potentially different from those of technological language. The poet’s task is that of “saying the world anew” and “to bring what is not-yet-seen into appearance” from this traditional language. (78) However, the function of technological language to provide clear signs and sequences of signs is at odds with this task. Thus, as Heidegger saw it, this is why poetry “does not, on principle, let itself be programmed.” (79) With traditional language there is a special relation to language where humans speak only insofar as they “co-respond” to language - which is what “genuinely” speaks. (80) Following Goethe, Heidegger also distinguished this as the “deeper” and “poetic” relationship, in contrast with the “commonplace” and “superficial” relationship. (81) It regards what he calls “the language that has grown historically . . . the mother tongue,” the language to which the human being’s essence is commended and within which the human speaks. Thus, with regard to traditional language, Heidegger proposes considering the special character of “instruction in the mother tongue” in this the age of the language of Enframing. In fact, he suggests, this language instruction might have to be, instead of an “education,” a “reflection” on the danger threatening language and our relation to it. (82) At the same time, it must be a reflection on

the saving power that conceals itself in the mystery of language, insofar as it always brings us into the nearness of what is unspoken and what is inexpressible. (83)

*It must thus be a reflection on technological language and traditional language . . .*

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## Notes

(1) Martin Heidegger, *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache* (1962), Herausgegeben von Hermann Heidegger (St. Gallen, Erker, 1989). “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” trans. W. Torres Gregory, forthcoming in the *Journal of Philosophical Research* (1998).

(2) Martin Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik” (1953) in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954). “The Question Concerning Technology,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

(3) Martin Heidegger, "Der Weg zur Sprache" (1959) in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959). "The Way to Language" in *On the Way to Language*, trans. P.D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

(4) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 6.

(5) Ibid., 7-8. Heidegger quotes from Dschuang-Dsi, *Das wahre Buch vom südlichen Blütenland*, trans. R. Wilhelm (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1923), 7, 33 ff.

(6) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 20.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid., 21.

(9) Martin Heidegger, *What is Philosophy? -- Was ist das -die Philosophie?* (1955), (bilingual text), trans. W. Kluback and J. Wilde (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958), 92 (93).

(10) Martin Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?* (1951-1952) (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954), 87. *What is Called Thinking?*, trans F.D. Wieck and J.G. Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 128.

(11) See Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Phusis*. Aristotle's, Physik B, 1" (1939) in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt Am Main: Klostermann, 1976), 280. "On the Being and Conception of *Phusis* in Aristotle's Physics B, 1," in *Man and World* 9(1976), trans. T. Sheehan, 253. See also "Brief über den Humanismus" (1946) in *Wegmarken*, 317. "Letter on Humanism" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. D.F. Krell, trans. F.A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 197.

(12) "Der Weg zur Sprache," 247-8 (117-18). But, cf. *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 21-2, where Humbolt's conception of language as world view is contrasted with that of language of an instrument.

(13) Martin Heidegger, "Die Sprache," (1950) in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 13. "Language" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 191.

(14) Martin Heidegger, "Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie" (1964) in *Phänomenologie und Theologie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970), 39. "The Problem of a Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today's Theology" in *The Piety of Thinking*, trans. J.G. Hart and J.C. Maraldo (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976), 24.

(15) Ibid., 42-4 (27-8).

(16) Martin Heidegger, "Das Wesen der Sprache" (1957) in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 160. "On the Nature of Language" in *On the Way to Language*, 58. Cf. *ibid.*, 96-8 (203-5).

(17) Martin Heidegger, "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)" (1954) in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), 226. "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)" in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. D.F. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi (New York, Harper and Row, 1974), 81.

(18) *Was Heisst Denken?*, 10 (21-2).

(19) Martin Heidegger, "Nachwort zu 'Was ist Metaphysik?'" (1943) in *Wegmarken*, 308. "Postscript to 'What is Metaphysics?'" in *Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. W. Brock (New York: New American Library, 1975), 387.

(20) Martin Heidegger, "Hegel und die Griechen" (1958) in *Wegmarken*, 255.

(21) Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), 63-4. "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, 376. Cf. "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten" (1966) in *Der Spiegel*, 23 (1976), 213. "Only a God Can Save Us," *Der Spiegel* Interview, trans. W. Richardson, in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. T. Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981), 59.

(22) Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962), 122. *What is a Thing?*, trans. W.B. Barton and V. Deutsch (Chicago: Regnery, 1967), 156.

(23) "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)," 226 (81-2).

(24) *Was Heisst Denken?*, 205 (170).

(25) "Das Problem eines nicht objectivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie," 45 (28-9).

(26) *Ibid.*, 45 (29).

(27) *Was Heisst Denken?*, 55-6 (26).

(28) *Ibid.*, 56-8 (32-4).

(29) *Ibid.*, 58 (34-5).

(30) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 22.

(31) *Ibid.*

(32) "Der Weg zur Sprache," 263 (132). The textual translation of 'Ge-stell' here is 'Framing,' but I have changed it to 'Enframing' to allow for translation consistency throughout this text.

(33) Martin Heidegger, *Hebel -der Hausfreund* (1957) (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 35. "Hebel -Friend of the House," in *Contemporary German Philosophy* 3 (1983), trans. B.V. Flotz and M. Heim, 100. There is an earlier and shorter version in which Heidegger does not mention the language machine. See Martin Heidegger, "Gespräch mit Hebel"(1956) in *Hebeldank*, Herausgeben von Hanns Uhl (Freiburg: Rombach, 1960).

(34) In "Der Weg zur Sprache," 263, footnote #2, Heidegger refers the reader to his *Hebel -der Hausfreund*, 34ff. (99ff.).

(35) "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" (1938) in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950), 73. "The Age of the World-Picture," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 116.

(36) *Was Heisst Denken?*, 54 (24).

(37) *Hebel -der Hausfreund*, 36 (100).

(38) Ibid.

(39) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 23.

(40) Ibid., 24.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Ibid., 25.

(43) Ibid., 26.

(44) Ibid. Heidegger quotes from Norbert Wiener, *Mensch und Menschmaschine* (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1952), 85. *The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society* (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1950), 78.

(45) Ibid., 25.

(46) *Hebel -der Hausfreund*, 36 (100).

(47) "Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik" (1956-7) in *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 72."The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics" in *Identity and Difference*, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 73.

(48) "Brief über den Humanismus," 318 (199).

(49) *Was ist das -die Philosophie?*, 92 (93). Cf. *Was Heisst Denken?*, 89 (130).]

(50) "Der Weg zur Sprache," 243 (113).

- (51) "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," 36-7 (298-9).
- (52) *Was Heisst Denken?*, 83-4 (118-19).
- (53) "Das Problem eines nicht objectivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie," 44 (28).
- (54) *Was ist das -die Philosophie?* 92 (93).
- (55) *Was Heisst Denken?*, 51 (16).
- (56) *Ibid.*, 153 (99). Cf. "Die Sprache," 12 (190); "Der Weg zur Sprache," 249-50 (119), 256 (125).
- (57) "Die Sprache," 30 (207-8).
- (58) "Der Weg zur Sprache," 241 (111-12).
- (59) "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," 38 (300). Cf. "Der Weg zur Sprache," 258-9 (127-9).
- (60) ". . . dichterisch wohnt der Mensch . . .," 84 (215-16). Cf. "Bauen Wohnen Denken," 140 (146).
- (61) *Hebel -der Hausfreund*, 34 (99). Cf. "Das Problem eines nicht objectivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie," 41 (25); "Die Sprache," 31 (208); "Der Weg zur Sprache," 254-5 (123-4).
- (62) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 23.
- (63) *Ibid.*, 25.
- (64) "Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," 37 (299).
- (65) "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache" (1953) in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 114. "Dialogue on Language," in *On the Way to Language*, 23-4.
- (66) See Martin Heidegger, "Die Kehre" in *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962). "The Turning" in *The Question Concerning Technology*.
- (67) "Gelassenheit (Gedenkenrede)" (1955) in *Gelassenheit* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 25-6. "Memorial Address" in *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. J. Anderson and E.H. Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 55. Cf. William Lovitt, "Introduction" to *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, xxxii.
- (68) *Ibid.*, 24-5 (55).

(69) Cf. William Lovitt and Harriet Brundage Lovitt, *Modern Technology in the Heideggerian Perspective* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), 233-41.

(70) *Hebel -der Hausfreund*, 31 (98). Heidegger's emphasis.

(71) "Der Weg zur Sprache," 263-4 (132-3).

(72) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 26-7. Heidegger quotes from C. Fr. v. Weizsäcker, "Sprache als Information" in *Die Sprache, Fünfte Folge des Jahrbuchs Gestalt und Gedanke* (München: Oldenbourg, 1959), 70.

(73) *Ibid.*, 27.

(74) "Der Weg zur Sprache," 263-4 (132-3).

(75) Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986 ), 21. *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 42-3.

(76) "Brief über den Humanismus," 317 (197).

(77) Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, 126-30 (164-8); 167-70 (211-14); 173 (217).

(78) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 27.

(79) *Ibid.*, 25.

(80) *Hebel -der Hausfreund*, 34-5 (99).

(81) *Ibid.*, 37 (100). Heidegger quotes from Goethe's *Werke. 2 Abt. Bd. 11.* (Weimar 1893), 167.

(82) *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*, 27-8.

(83) *Ibid.*, 28.

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